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Abstract— This work introduces a novel modified Replicator 
Dynamics model, which includes external influences on the 
population. This framework models a realistic market into which 
companies, the external dynamic influences, invest resources in 
order to bolster their product’s standing and increase their 
market share. The dynamic influences change in each time step 
of the game, and directly modify the payoff matrix of the 
population’s interactions.  The model can learn from real data 
how each influence affects the market, and can be used to 
simulate and predict the outcome of a real system.  We 
specifically analyze how a new technology can compete and 
attempt to unseat an entrenched technology as the market leader.  
We establish a relationship between the external influences and 
the population payoff matrix and show how the system can be 
implemented to predict outcomes in a real market by simulating 
the rise of the Android mobile operating system over its primary 
competition, the iPhone, from 2009-2017.   
 
Index Terms— Evolutionary game theory, Product markets, 
Replicator dynamics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
VERY real environment is in a state of perpetual flux, 
especially those that share a close relationship with 
technology. As technologies evolve in a free market, 
competition inevitably arises; sometimes, one company 
dominates, and other companies expend resources to make 
inroads. No matter the specifics, competition leads to each 
individual in the market choosing which technology to use 
based on the relative value of each to the user. 
Replicator dynamics provides a useful framework in which 
to analyze competitive markets, as it models a population of 
identical individuals who choose a strategy based on its 
projected payoff, or the value to the user [1]. However, the 
original replicator equation’s payoff is a function only of the 
portion of the population which employs each strategy; the 
strategy with the larger user base dominates [1]. In a free and 
active market, however, each rational company will invest 
assets to increase its product’s adoption rate, and thus its 
profits. 
Previous extensions of the replicator dynamic model have 
included feedback loops between the environment and the 
strategy payoffs [2], as well as the effects of localization 
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factors on individualization of strategies [3][10]; however, 
while including some environmental dynamism, these 
approaches still do not model an environment in which 
external parties actively influence the market over time, while 
the individuals in the population remain homogeneous. 
Additionally, previous applications of the replicator 
framework to realistic scenarios have not focused on dynamic 
modification over time to the payoff matrix [9][11][12][13]. In 
addition, to the best of our knowledge, no work exists in 
integrating real data into such a model in order to make 
predictions on a real world system. These characteristics are 
necessary to create a model that can accurately emulate and 
predict a realistic marketplace. 
This work introduces a general method to realistically 
model the dynamic influence of external factors on an 
unmodified population, and investigates the actions necessary 
for such an outside influence to achieve specific goals. We 
then apply this method to specifically address the case of a 
market that is initially dominated by an entrenched 
technology, describing the conditions necessary for a smaller, 
emerging technology to compete and, eventually, overtake the 
market leader.  Our model not only predicts market conditions 
based on input information, but it also provides the user with 
information about the intrinsic properties of the marketplace. 
Because our approach emphasizes realism and applications 
for modeling real markets, we conduct a simulation of the real 
case of the world’s smartphone market from 2009-2017 to 
prove the efficacy of our model. This range captures the rise 
of the Android smartphone operating system (OS) and its 
ascension to dominance over the Apple iPhone, which had 
hitherto led the market [4].  
II. MODEL 
A. General Replicator Dynamics Model 
Replicator dynamics models the evolution of a population of 
identical individuals who employ one of n strategies and 
receive a payoff from each interaction with other individuals 
based only on each individual’s choice of strategy [1]. A 
player employing strategy i who interacts with one employing 
a strategy j receives a payoff 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; the set of payoffs can be 
expressed as a matrix: 
 
                          𝐴𝐴 = �𝐴𝐴11 𝐴𝐴12𝐴𝐴21 𝐴𝐴22 ⋯ 𝐴𝐴1𝑛𝑛⋯ 𝐴𝐴2𝑛𝑛⋮ ⋮
𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛1 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛2
⋱ ⋮
⋯ 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
�              (1) 
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A fraction 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] of the population employs the strategy 
i. The replicator equation expresses the growth rate of this 
portion of the population: 
𝑥𝑥𝚤𝚤̇ = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖((𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥)𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥)             (2) 
A strategy’s usage only increases if its payoff is higher than 
the average payoff in the population. Thus, the expected 
payoff of each strategy directly modifies the individuals’ 
choices of which strategy to employ. 
The growth expressed by the replicator equation (2) 
captures the change in the fractions of the population that 
employ each strategy over time, showing how a higher payoff 
causes a strategy to gain prominence in the population. 
Note that for the population’s strategy distribution to change 
significantly, the elements of A must be very different. It can 
be seen from (2) that if all elements of A are approximately 
equal, then the payoff of each strategy will be very close to the 
average, and thus no strategy’s growth rate will be significant. 
B. Two Strategy Replicator Dynamics Model 
To model a technology market with one entrenched, 
dominant technology and one new technology, we formulate a 
population with two strategies available to each individual, 
where each strategy represents the usage of one of the two 
technologies. The payoff matrix A becomes: 
 
𝐴𝐴 = �𝐴𝐴11 𝐴𝐴12𝐴𝐴21 𝐴𝐴22�           (3) 
 
1) Equilibrium Conditions 
The two strategy replicator dynamics model has three 
equilibrium points at which the growth of each strategy is 
zero: 
𝑥𝑥1̇ = 𝑥𝑥2̇ = 0    (4) 
 
Two are trivial, wherein one strategy grows to engulf the 
entire market and the other is driven to extinction. The third 
equilibrium point can be found by using (2) and (4): 
 
𝑥𝑥�1 = 𝐴𝐴22−𝐴𝐴12(𝐴𝐴11+𝐴𝐴22)−(𝐴𝐴21+𝐴𝐴12)           (5) 
 
It is important to note that the equilibrium conditions reached 
are dependent not only on the system’s parameters, but also on 
the initial conditions; if one strategy starts with a market share 
of zero, then it never grows and the system stays constant. 
 
2) Impact of Payoff Matrix Element Values on System 
Evolution 
The elements of the payoff matrix directly influence the 
outcome of the market. Thus, the behavior of the system can 
be changed by modifying the elements of the payoff matrix in 
specific ways. An external party looking to influence the 
market should attempt to make its strategy (i.e. technology) 
constantly grow and finally reach equilibrium at a dominant 
position. 
In order to grow, a strategy’s payoff must be greater than 
the average; (2) indicates that this condition is necessary for 
the growth rate to be positive. This constraint leads to 
condition (6) 
𝑥𝑥1̇ > 0 → 𝐴𝐴11𝑥𝑥1 + 𝐴𝐴12𝑥𝑥2 > 𝐴𝐴21𝑥𝑥1 + 𝐴𝐴22𝑥𝑥2  (6) 
 
When combined with (5), we see that growth of 𝑥𝑥1 requires: 
𝑥𝑥1 > 𝑥𝑥�1    (7) 
This condition implies that the system moves away from 
this mixed equilibrium, not towards it, making this point an 
unstable equilibrium point; it also tells us that the payoff 
matrix A must favor a low value mixed equilibrium in order 
for 𝑥𝑥1 to continue to grow.  
Condition (7), combined with (2) and (6), allow us to 
analyze the effects and desirable traits of each of the four 
payoff elements from the standpoint of strategy 1’s proponent, 
the external influence working in favor of strategy 1. 
To attain growth, 𝐴𝐴11 should be increased according to (2). 
This compensates for the small initial value of 𝑥𝑥1. As 𝑥𝑥1 
approaches dominance, 𝐴𝐴11 can be allowed to decrease as 
lower growth is expected. 𝐴𝐴12 should be kept large in the 
beginning to allow for the dominance of strategy 1, but its 
value becomes less important as 𝑥𝑥1 increases. 𝐴𝐴21 should also 
be kept large enough to allow for dominance of 𝑥𝑥1, but it 
should decrease as 𝑥𝑥1 increases as this will allow the growth 
rate of 𝑥𝑥1 to increase.  
Note that 𝐴𝐴22 is not under the control of an influence of 
strategy 1. A technology’s interactions with itself should be 
controlled only by the company that owns it. We can expect, 
however, that in a population where 𝑥𝑥1 is increasing, 𝐴𝐴22 is 
likely to be small in magnitude. 
C. Dynamic Influence Extension 
We now formulate an extension to the payoff matrix that 
allows such modifications, as outlined above, to be made by 
an external influence on the market. We construct a column 
vector where each element 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦] represents an 
influencing factor. These factors are inputs that affect the 
market and can be modified by the policies of companies in 
the market, such as product pricing or investments (which 
directly impact the quality of the product). The number of the 
inputs 𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦 needed to accurately characterize the markets will 
depend entirely on the properties of the markets under 
investigation, and has no direct relation to 𝑛𝑛. The system will 
be able to model the market evolution only if the major 
relevant inputs that characterize that particular market are 
identified.  
Considering ny influencing input factors, each element of 
the payoff matrix becomes a linear combination of these 
factors.  The linear coefficients are expressed as a newly 
defined  𝑛𝑛2 × 𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦 matrix 𝛼𝛼.  To illustrate the influence of the 
input parameters on the elements of matrix A, the payoff 
matrix A can be re-indexed with a single index 𝑘𝑘 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛2], 
traversing row by row, where 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖 − 1) + 𝑗𝑗 and i,j are the 
original indices 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛].  Consequently, each element of 
the payoff matrix can be expressed as a linear combination of 
the input factors: 
𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦                                        (8) 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 is the kth row of the coefficient matrix 𝛼𝛼.  
This representation allows the external influences to have a 
direct impact on the outcome of the market.  As stated above, 
a few constraints must be placed on this matrix 𝛼𝛼 to maintain 
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realism; specifically, any factor controlled by company i must 
only affect terms involving strategy i.  
This modification makes A entirely dynamic, able to take on 
different values during each iteration of the simulation.  This 
allows the model to take into account the influence of external 
parties which change their strategies based on the market.  An 
external party can evaluate how its input affects the payoff 
matrix and thus the market, and react by changing its input 
values accordingly.  These factors may include investments a 
company makes into its product, pricing of its product, or any 
other values that have a direct impact on the quality and 
availability of its technology. 
The value of 𝛼𝛼 is a constant, and it represents an intrinsic 
property of the market’s interactions with the input factors.  
For any particular market and input set y, 𝛼𝛼 must be learned 
using real data.  The value of 𝛼𝛼 gives the user insight into the 
market, showing the influence of each input on the utility of 
each product. This stands in contrast to other learning 
methods, in which the learned parameters give no insight into 
the simulated system.  
In our simulation, we employ a simple exhaustive search 
and evaluate candidate results via a least mean squares error 
metric, while withholding 20% of the available data in 
accordance with common practice [5].  When training the 
system, learning the parameters of A, this last 20% of data was 
withheld from the set; this tests the model’s predictive 
capability.  A mean squared error metric was used as it is 
computationally simple and accurately represents the validity 
of the result. 
𝐽𝐽 = 1
𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓
∑ �𝑥𝑥1
∗(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑥𝑥1(𝑡𝑡)�2𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡=1            (9) 
Where 𝑥𝑥∗(𝑡𝑡) is the prediction at time 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡) is the real 
data at time 𝑡𝑡. 
Due to the time dynamic nature of these modifications, the 
system no longer has a single guaranteed equilibrium value to 
which it will converge.  At each time step, the system has a 
target equilibrium to which it would converge if the system 
inputs y were to stay constant.  The system does not 
necessarily reach this equilibrium, however, because the 
system changes over time. The system converges to a final 
equilibrium only when the inputs y, and thus the payoff 
matrix, converge to a constant value.  
III. SIMULATION 
A. Setup and Data 
To validate the accuracy of the proposed model for practical 
applications, a simulation was conducted on data from the 
global smartphone market from Quarter 1 (Q1) 2009 to Q1 
2017.  This range was chosen as it captures the rise of the 
Google Android platform to dominance over the Apple iPhone 
in market share.  In order to simulate a two-strategy system, 
the smartphone market is simplified to just Android and iOS; 
while other platforms existed, these two grew to dominate the 
market as the modern wave of touchscreen smartphones 
developed [4]. 
The system takes four input factors 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖: average pricing for 
 
Fig 2.  System outputs.  The inflection point in the market and the values in 
the validation points are accurately predicted by the system. 
 
Fig 1.  System inputs.  These inputs contribute directly to the growth or 
shrinkage of each technology in the market.  Note the difference in 
magnitudes between the investment factors, as well as the opposing trend 
directions of the products’ pricing. 
 
Fig 3.  Payoff Matrix Coefficients.  These four computed factors determine 
the market behavior as discussed in Section II, and their values are a direct 
result of the system inputs.  Note the small magnitude of A22 as well as the 
trend directions of A11, A12, and A21. 
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Android and iOS smartphones sold each quarter [8], and 
quarterly research investments in mobile from Apple [6] and 
Samsung [7], the largest Android phone manufacturer.  These 
factors were chosen as they are determined by the device 
manufacturers’ direct influence and have a direct impact on 
the devices’ market performance.  The values of these factors 
over the simulation period are shown in Fig. 1; these values 
were obtained directly from real data [6][7][8].  The data was 
sampled quarterly, to match the available frequency of 
investment data from the companies’ quarterly reports. This 
gave a total of 33 time samples in the simulation period. Even 
with this relatively sparse data, the model remained effective; 
results are discussed further in Section III-D. 
The system is initialized at the market shares determined by 
inputting the first real data point into the system; this is vital to 
obtaining a result that mirrors the reality of the market.  The 
initial conditions are central to the determination of the 
system’s behavior, as mentioned in Section II-B, so they must 
be based on the real data. 
As discussed in IIC, a subset consisting of approximately 
20% of the latest data, or 7 time samples, is withheld from the 
training set to serve as a validation set in order to determine 
the system’s predictive capability. 
B. Implementation 
A grid search is employed to optimize 𝛼𝛼. For each candidate 
value, the complete evolution of the system over the training 
interval is computed.  For each time step in the evolution, the 
matrix A is computed as defined in (8) and normalized, and 
the growth rates of the two technologies (Android and iOS) 
are computed (2).  The market values at all time-steps are 
computed using the A and growth rate obtained for the 
candidate 𝛼𝛼 value, and the error J between this prediction and 
the real data is computed. The value of 𝛼𝛼 with the lowest error 
over the training interval is chosen.  This 𝛼𝛼 is used for 
validation in section D. 
C. Conditions on 𝛼𝛼  for Optimization  
A is normalized to keep all elements 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1], in 
accordance with the standard replicator equation conditions 
(1).  Thus the magnitude of 𝛼𝛼 does not matter, as the system’s 
behavior is determined by the relative size of its elements.  
The grid search was conducted over an interval [−𝑟𝑟, 𝑟𝑟] by 
integer steps; the search domain was optimized as a hyper 
parameter of the system over multiple trials, and a value of 
𝑟𝑟 = 4 was chosen for this simulation. The complexity of the 
search increases on the order of (2𝑟𝑟 + 1)𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦∗𝑛𝑛2/2, or (2𝑟𝑟 + 1)8 
in this particular simulation; this makes increasing the search 
interval very computationally expensive.  The value of 𝑟𝑟 
determines the resolution of the resulting 𝛼𝛼, and must be 
chosen by trial and error. For our simulation we started with 
𝑟𝑟 = 1 and increased 𝑟𝑟 until the error between the simulated 
curve and the real market evolution was less than 4 × 10−5. 
Since the search is conducted by integer steps and the 
resulting A is normalized, an interval of [−𝑟𝑟, 𝑟𝑟] is equivalent 
to searching on an interval of [−1,1] with a step size of 1/𝑟𝑟. A 
higher value for 𝑟𝑟 is desirable for better resolution of the 
search, however a high value for r induces a higher 
computational complexity. The complexity increases with 
both the number of shares in the market, 𝑛𝑛, and the number of 
input factors 𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦. This model is well suited to technological 
markets, where typically only a few companies have the 
capability to compete effectively.  Technological markets also 
often have a high barrier to entry, making the study of the 
confict between a dominant product and a new competitor 
especially relevant. 
Imposing practical, common sense constraints, the effect of 
the companies’ influences on their respective products must be 
identical; a change in an input parameter for product 1 must 
cause a variation in the payoff coefficients symmetric to the 
result of the same change in the same input parameter for 
product 2.  If parameters 𝑦𝑦1 and 𝑦𝑦2 are the same input for the 
two respective products, then the rates of change of A’s 
elements must be constrained by  
 
Fig 4.  System outputs in simulation with constant inputs, using 𝛼𝛼 optimized 
with real data.  This shows that the strategy Android employed to gain 
dominance in the market had a great effect on increasing its final market 
share. 
TABLE I 
OPTIMIZED VALUES OF  𝛼𝛼 
Simulation 
 𝒚𝒚𝟏𝟏 𝒚𝒚𝟐𝟐 𝒚𝒚𝟑𝟑 𝒚𝒚𝟒𝟒 
𝑨𝑨𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝛼𝛼11 𝛼𝛼12 𝛼𝛼13 𝛼𝛼14 
𝑨𝑨𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐 𝛼𝛼21 𝛼𝛼22 𝛼𝛼23 𝛼𝛼24 
𝑨𝑨𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏 𝛼𝛼31 𝛼𝛼32 𝛼𝛼33 𝛼𝛼34 
𝑨𝑨𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 𝛼𝛼41 𝛼𝛼42 𝛼𝛼43 𝛼𝛼44 
     
 
Real Data 4 0 -1 0 
0 3 1 3 
3 0 3 1 
0 4 0 -1 
    
 
Constant Market 
(iOS dominant) 
4 0 2 0 
0 3 -3 4 
3 0 4 -3 
0 4 0 2 
 
  The value structure shows to which input 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  and payoff matrix element  
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 each element of 𝛼𝛼 belongs, as each is a linear coefficient for one input in 
one payoff element. 
𝑦𝑦1: Android Investment 𝑦𝑦3: Android Price 
𝑦𝑦2: iOS Investment 𝑦𝑦4: iOS Price 
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𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
 = 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
; 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = {1,2}         (10) 
Since these partial derivatives are linear, this can be 
accomplished by constraining the values of the elements of 𝛼𝛼 
which correspond to these enforced relations to be equal 
because the elements of 𝛼𝛼 are the rates of change of A’s 
elements with respect to the input parameters y.  These 
constraints ensure that the system remains symmetric.  If we 
linearly index A with a single variable 𝑙𝑙, traversing row by row 
as stated in Section IIC, 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘
 corresponds to 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 as each row of 
𝛼𝛼 corresponds to one element of A, as expressed in (8). 
Note that any influence on technology i should not exert an 
influence on 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, as discussed in Section IIB.  Thus the 
elements of 𝛼𝛼 corresponding to these factors are zero.  In a 
two strategy population, there will be one such factor for each 
input as each input corresponds exclusively to one technology.   
D. Analysis 
The simulated and real data can be seen in Fig. 2.  The 
model was trained using the training set, and then the system 
was allowed to evolve on its own, employing its learned value  
of α and the real market input data (prices and investments) 
for the duration corresponding to the validation set. Its 
computed market share values had a mean squared error 
of 3.0 × 10−5 with respect to the real data for this period.  
This reflects the ability of the system to predict future data 
with high accuracy.  While this simulation approached an 
equilibrium state, this is due to the inputs remaining fairly 
constant near the end of the simulation period; such a 
convergence is not guaranteed in this model, as discussed in 
Section II-C. 
The values of A’s elements (Fig. 3) in the simulation 
conformed well to expected behaviors from Section IIB.  𝐴𝐴11 
increases while technology 1 (Android) holds a small market 
share, and starts to decrease after the inflection point in the 
market.  𝐴𝐴12 remains large with some fluctuation throughout 
the simulation.  𝐴𝐴21 starts large to allow for initial growth, 
then decreases as Android reaches a dominant market position.  
𝐴𝐴22 is small in magnitude in comparison to the other 
coefficients; this is to be expected in a market where 
technology 1 is growing its market share.  However, 𝐴𝐴22 did 
increase over the simulation period, reflecting Apple’s 
increased investment in iOS and their pricing decreases near 
the end of the observed period, likely an effort to grow iOS’s 
market share. 
The system’s accuracy to both the real market values and 
the expected internal behavior indicate its efficacy in 
modelling the marketplace.  The small input data size of 33 
time steps coupled with these results indicate that the system 
is able to perform with much less data than would be required 
for many learning based models.  Its replicator foundation 
specifically models strategy fitness as a function of 
population, an important feature when dealing with 
technologies that require a user base to stay viable.  Versus a 
general learning method, the model only has to learn the 
specific nature of a particular market rather than learning the 
nature of markets in general; this allows it to perform well 
with less data, as less information has to be learned.   
E. Analysis and Significance of 𝛼𝛼 
The value of 𝛼𝛼 obtained from the simulation using real data 
is shown in Table 1.  The values of its individual elements 
show the effect of each input on the payoff matrix, and thus 
the market.  As can be expected, higher investment of each 
company in its own product positively effects its own 
product’s utility (α11 and α42), and higher pricing of each 
product negatively effects its utility (α13 and α44).  Similarly, 
increased research spending also increases the utility that the 
product’s users obtain from interacting with the competitor 
technology (α22 and α31), indicating efforts to increase cross 
compatibility to increase market uptake.  
A second simulation was run, in which the optimized value 
of α was used to predict a market outcome where the 
companies kept a constant level of investment and pricing, 
equal to that in the first time step.  This was done to assess the 
effectiveness of the strategies employed by each company, and 
determine what effect the feedback from the market had on the 
outcome.  The results of this simulation can be seen in Fig. 4; 
Android still becomes dominant, but its market share saturates 
at a lower value.  This would seem to indicate that Android’s 
strategy of decreasing price and increasing investment payed 
off significantly.   
Finally, a third simulation was conducted in which the 
market shares were held constant. This was done to observe 
what type of market would have allowed iOS to remain 
dominant, given the real input data.  The value of α optimized 
for this hypothetical situation is also shown in Table 1.  
Investments play a similar role in increasing a product’s 
utility, but higher prices now have a large positive effect on 
the utility of each product (α13, α44).  Such an unrealistic 
property makes sense because iOS devices have a much higher 
price compared to Android devices throughout the simulation 
period. If consumers wanted to pay a higher price, then this 
would have improved iOS’s market share size rather than 
shrinking it. 
Analyzing these simulations shows that the properties of α 
reflect real properties of the market. This direct relation is the 
core advantage of this model over other learning based 
methods: the learned parameters give direct insight into the 
market reaction relative to the inputs.  This could potentially 
allow a market player to not only simulate strategies and 
observe the outcome, but also to understand how the 
individual inputs under its control could modify the market 
share evolution.  The players could then devise a strategy that 
achieves the desired outcome based on this knowledge of the 
market. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This work extends the Replicator Dynamics framework to 
analyze a system with external influencing factors.  It modifies 
the payoff matrix of the core system to adapt to external 
factors, and learns parameters to model that dependence.  This 
enables the system to contend with external factors that 
influence an otherwise symmetric population, an ability not 
present in previous replicator formulations.  This modified 
framework was applied to the rise of the Android platform to 
mobile OS market dominance between 2009 and 2017; the 
proposed system accurately modeled the evolution of each 
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technology’s market share for several fiscal quarters, 
employing parameters obtained via optimization over a 
training set.  The simulation also produced intermediate 
parameter behavior which closely corresponded with 
theoretical predictions for a scenario such as the rise of 
Android over iOS, starting from a small initial market share.  
This simulation result indicates that the system can be 
employed to accurately model and predict the evolution of 
markets in real-world scenarios.  This model could aid in 
predicting the outcome of variations in strategy of companies 
in a marketplace, making it a useful tool to create new 
strategies which can produce a desired outcome. 
REFERENCES 
[1] R. Cressman, “Symmetric Normal Form Games,” in 
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, 
Cambridge, MA, USA: The MIT Press, 2003, ch. 2, 
sec. 1, pp.19-22. 
[2] J.S. Weitz, C. Eksin, K. Paarporn, S. P. Brown, and 
W. C. Ratcliff, “An oscillating tragedy of the 
commons in replicator dynamics with game-
environment feedback,” PNAS, vol. 113, no. 47, pp. 
E7518-E7525, Nov. 2016. [Online]. DOI: 
10.1073/pnas.1604096113. 
[3] F. Pieper and S. Mostaghim, "Influence of dynamic 
environments on agent strategies," 2016 IEEE 
Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence 
(SSCI), Athens, 2016, pp. 1-8. doi: 10.1109/SSCI.
2016.7850159 
[4] “Mobile Operating System Market Share 
Worldwide,” StatCounter Global Stats. Accessed 
September 15, 2017. [Online]. Available: 
http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/
worldwide/  
[5] T. M. Mitchell, “Decision Tree Learning,” in 
Machine Learning.  New York, NY, USA: McGraw-
Hill, 1997, ch. 3, sec. 7.1, pp.68-70. 
[6] “Earnings Releases,” Apple Inc., Investor Relations. 
Accessed September 15, 2017. [Online]. Available: 
http://investor.apple.com/financials.cfm  
[7] “Earnings Releases,” Samsung Global, Investor 
Relations.  Accessed September 15, 2017. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.samsung.com/global/ir/
financial-information/earnings-release/  
[8] F. Richter, “The Smartphone Price Gap,” Statista, 
June 2, 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.statista.com/chart/4954/smartphone-
average-selling-prices/  
[9] K. Coninx and T. Holvoet, “Darwin in Smart Power 
Grids – Evolutionary Game Theory for Analyzing 
Self-Organization in Demand-Side Aggregation,” 
International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-
Organizing Systems, Saso, 2015-october, 2015, pp. 
101–110. 
[10] A. Pantoja and N. Quijano, “Distributed optimization 
using population dynamics with a local replicator,” 
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and 
Control, vol. 3790-3795, 2012, pp. 3790–3795. 
[11] J. Huang, J. Wang, H. Zhang, and N. Wang, “2017 
Ieee 2nd Advanced Information Technology, 
Electronic and Automation Control Conference 
(Iaeac).” Network Defense Strategy Selection Based 
on Best-Response Dynamic Evolutionary Game 
Model, IEEE, 2017, pp. 2611–2615. 
[12] S. D’Oro, L. Galluccio, S. Palazzo, and G. Schembra, 
“A Game Theoretic Approach for Distributed 
Resource Allocation and Orchestration of 
Softwarized Networks.” IEEE Journal on Selected 
Areas in Communications, vol. 35, no. 3, 2017, pp. 
721–735. 
[13] M. A. Shattal, A. Wisnieswska, A. Al-Fugaha, B. 
Khan, K. Dombrowski, “Evolutionary Game Theory 
Perspective on Dynamic Spectrum Access Etiquette.” 
IEEE Access, (2017 08 22), 2017. 
 
Elijah D. Bolluyt received the B.S. degree 
in engineering physics and the M.E. degree 
in electrical engineering from Stevens 
Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, in 
2017.  He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. 
degree in computer engineering at Stevens 
Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ. 
During the summer of 2015, he was a 
Scholars summer researcher with the Department of Physics 
and Engineering Physics at Stevens Institute of Technology.  
During the summer of 2016, he was an Engineering Intern at 
Kulite Semiconductor, Inc. in Leonia, NJ.  His current 
research interests focus on the development of computational 
frameworks, employing game theory and machine learning 
techniques.  
Mr. Bolluyt is a recipient of the Provost’s Doctoral 
Fellowship (Stevens Institute of Technology). 
 
Cristina Comaniciu received the M.S. 
degree in electronics from the Polytechnic 
University of Bucharest in 1993, and the 
Ph.D. degree in electrical and computer 
engineering from Rutgers University in 
2002.  
From 2002 to 2003 she was a 
postdoctoral fellow with the Department 
of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University. Since August 
2003, she is with Stevens Institute of Technology, Department 
of Electrical and Computer Engineering, where she is now an 
Associate Professor and serves as Associate Department Chair 
for Graduate Studies. In Fall 2011 she was a visiting faculty 
fellow with the Department of Electrical Engineering, 
Princeton University. She served as an associate editor for the 
IEEE COMMUNICATION LETTERS (2007-2011).  
Professor Comaniciu is a recipient of the 2007 IEEE 
Marconi Best Paper Prize Award in Wireless Communications 
and of the 2012 Rutgers School of Engineering Distinguished 
Young Alumnus Medal of Excellence. She is a coauthor of the 
book Wireless Networks: Multiuser Detection in Cross-Layer 
Design (Springer, NY). Her research interests are focused on 
applications of game theory, evolutionary games and machine 
learning for resource management and optimization of 
complex distributed networks. 
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TEVC.2018.2881973
Copyright (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
